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I. Introduction 
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as 
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that 
which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of 
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially 
secures to every man, whatever is his own.1  
These words are no less true today than when James Madison 
wrote them for the National Gazette in 1792, as concerns over 
ownership and property occupy a central place in our 
jurisprudence.2 Property rights are some of the most foundational 
known to the law, both providing a major impetus to its historical 
development and creating many of the most familiar interactions 
that a citizen will have with the legal system.3 The protection of 
property rights was an animating factor behind the creation of the 
Bill of Rights, with the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution directly protecting the right to property.4 This 
constitutional protection has given rise to innumerable legal 
assertions of property rights by American citizens over the 
centuries since its passage.  
While the body of property rights involves nuanced common, 
constitutional, and statutory legal interactions, many of the most 
insightful jurists have highlighted the dispositive importance of 
the right to exclude as a central factor behind the law’s approach 
to property.5 The significance of the right to exclude takes on a 
particular importance in matters of real property for both cultural 
and historical reasons, and volumes of scholarship have been 
                                                                                                     
 1. James Madison, For the National Gazette, 27 March 1792, FOUNDERS 
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-14-02-0238 (last 
visited Feb. 1, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice).  
 2. See Paul Turner & Sam Kalen, Takings and Beyond: Implications for 
Regulation, 19 ENERGY L.J. 25, 46 (1998) (discussing the importance of property 
rights in the development of American federal constitutional jurisprudence). 
 3. See id. (describing the importance of property rights as a dominant 
theme during the founding and throughout America’s federal constitutional 
jurisprudence). 
 4. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (containing the Takings Clause: “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”). 
 5. See Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. 
REV. 730, 731 (1998) (describing the central role that the right to exclude holds in 
defining property). 
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produced on issues pertaining to the importance of that right when 
placed in conflict with harms almost entirely of a symbolic nature.6  
A. Virginia and the Atlantic Coast Pipeline 
Of all the modern legal battlegrounds between eminent 
domain authority and real property rights, one of the most 
noteworthy is occasioned by the development of utilities, most 
significantly in the context of energy development.7 Publicized and 
protracted battles between landowners and utility companies have 
erupted across the nation, as pipeline and power line construction 
continues to require the use of private land for public benefit.8 The 
construction of new pipelines has pitted pro-development business 
and political interests against anti-pipeline landowners and 
environmentalists, creating a charged atmosphere in which 
takings jurisprudence occupies a central role.9 As a logical result 
of this context, statutory authority for private entities to perform 
surveys—a limitation on the landowner’s right to exclude that is 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of 
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 995 (2004) (stating that recovery is possible under 
the common law in cases of trespass to real property even without actual harm). 
 7. See generally Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Eminent Domain: Right to 
Enter Land for Preliminary Survey or Examination, 29 A.L.R.3d 1104 (1970) 
(outlining the arguments for and against the practice of delegating eminent 
domain authority for surveying purposes). 
 8. See Keith Schneider, Nebraska Regulators Approve Keystone XL Pipeline 
After Years of Controversy, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017, 12:15 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-nebraska-keystone-20171120-story.html 
(describing the legal conflict surrounding construction of the Keystone XL 
Pipeline) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also Blake Nicholson, Lawsuit Filed by Dakota Access Protesters to 
Proceed, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.apnews. 
com/a0bf90f2e1854218832a39ab22ba50a9 (detailing a lawsuit filed by Dakota 
Access Pipeline protesters in North Dakota alleging civil rights violations) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 9. See Michael Martz, Dominion to Withdraw Lawsuits Against 
Landowners Over Pipeline Surveys—and Start Over, DAILY PROGRESS (Apr. 7, 
2015), http://www.dailyprogress.com/news/local/dominion-to-withdraw-lawsuits-
against-landowners-over-pipeline-surveys-and/article_02d78830-dd81-11e4-
9fd4-833eaaf2afc1.html (reporting on Dominion Transmission Inc.’s legal battles 
with landowners over construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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itself a harbinger of future takings—has become a flash point in 
the larger eminent domain conflict.10 
This conflict has taken on a particular recent importance in 
Virginia, where construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline has 
engendered significant legal pushback by landowners.11 The 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline (ACP) is a proposed 600-mile natural gas 
transmission pipeline to be built in the states of West Virginia, 
Virginia, and North Carolina.12 The pipeline is to be built and 
operated by Atlantic, a company created by utility corporations 
Dominion Energy, Duke Energy, Piedmont Natural Gas, and 
Southern Company Gas.13 The controversial pipeline was approved 
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission in October of 2017, 
and preliminary tree-felling work commenced January 2018.14  
The project continued to face stiff opposition in its first year, 
with the most serious challenges stemming from an ongoing series 
of legal actions.15 In December 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                     
 10. See id. (detailing the resistance of property owners to legal surveys 
conducted by natural gas companies). 
 11. See id. (referencing multiple lawsuits filed by both landowners and the 
Atlantic Coast Pipeline consortium). 
 12. Atlantic Coast Pipeline, DOMINION ENERGY, 
https://www.dominionenergy.com/about-us/natural-gas-projects/atlantic-coast-
pipeline (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 13. See id. (describing the origins of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline).  
 14. See Emily Brown, Nelson Residents React to Federal Approval of Atlantic 
Coast Pipeline, NEWS & ADVANCE (Oct 14, 2017), 
http://www.newsadvance.com/news/local/nelson-residents-react-to-federal-
approval-ofatlantic-coast-pipeline/article_a56dd0ef-14c6-5389-b5d6-138a06 
00566f.html (“[T]he three members of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission issued a certificate of public convenience and necessity authorizing 
ACP to construct and operate the $5 billion, 600-mile project . . . .”) (on file with 
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Lowell 
Rose, Dominion Energy Introduces Interactive Map for Atlantic Coast Pipeline, 
NBC (Feb. 16, 2018, 5:08 PM), http://www.nbc29.com/story/37526947/dominion-
energy-introduces-interactive-map-for-atlantic-coast-pipeline (referencing an 
interactive map illustrating the construction and timeline of the Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 15. See Gregory Schneider, As Court Challenges Pile Up, Gas Pipeline Falls 
Behind, WASH. POST (Dec. 31. 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
virginia-politics/as-court-challenges-pile-up-gas-pipeline-falls-behind/2018/12/29/8 
637dbd2-0549-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=. 
2008d55d32d3 (“Protesters banging drums may get more attention, but what has 
really damaged the controversial Atlantic Coast Pipeline in 2018 has been quiet 
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Appeals vacated U.S. Forest permits that allowed the pipeline to 
cross protected lands and stayed the granting of new permits 
related to endangered species until ongoing environmental 
litigation has been resolved.16 Attempts by the ACP to narrow the 
scope of the stay have proved unsuccessful.17 In the same month, 
Nelson County denied floodplain crossing requests, which has 
forced the Pipeline to bring suit requesting federal preemption.18 
As of January 2019, construction has stalled on the ACP, and the 
project faces an uncertain future in the courts.19  
Proponents of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline claim that its 
construction will create jobs in the communities that it passes 
through, while also generating revenue for the three states in the 
form of additional taxes, and aiding consumers through projected 
energy savings.20 The ACP website additionally claims to have 
                                                                                                     
action taking place in courtrooms.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 16. See id. (“The judges were particularly harsh, finding that Forest Service 
staffers had raised serious questions about the permits but then made a sharp, 
unexplained turnaround and approved them. The court called the decision 
‘mysterious.’”); see also Carl Surran, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Halted Again by U.S. 
Circuit Court, SEEKING ALPHA (Dec. 7, 2018, 7:10 PM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/news/3415460-atlantic-coast-pipeline-halted-u-s-
circuit-court (“The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has stayed new permits 
related to vulnerable species for the 600-mile, 1.5B cf/day Atlantic Coast Pipeline 
project.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 17. See Carl Surran, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Bid to Ease Stay Rejected by 
Appeals Court, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 14, 2019 10:27 AM), 
https://seekingalpha.com/news/3422749-atlantic-coast-pipeline-bid-ease-stay-
rejected-appeals-court (“The Fourth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said Friday it 
will not ease its stay on a permit for the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, increasing 
prospects for a delay . . . .”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 18. See Emily Brown, Atlantic Coast Pipeline Sues Nelson County over 
Zoning Decision, NEWS & ADVANCE (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.newsadvance.com/news/local/atlantic-coast-pipeline-sues-nelson-
county-over-zoning-decision/article_47164c00-6573-5f1c-9c86-
fa41462048d7.html (“The lawsuit . . . is seeking a judgment stating the Natural 
Gas Act ‘preempts’ the requirements of Nelson’s floodplain ordinance, which 
would include ‘obtaining any zoning permits for any of the floodplain crossings.’”) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 19. See Surran, supra note 17 (stating that the Fourth Circuit’s stay could 
cause a significant delay in the construction of the pipeline). 
 20. See About ACP, ATLANTIC COAST PIPELINE, 
https://atlanticcoastpipeline.com/about/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2019) 
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made extensive revisions to the planned route in order to 
accommodate the concerns of environmentalists and landowners.21 
The opposition to the ACP is mostly composed of these residential 
landowners and environmentalists in areas surrounding the 
projected path.22 Environmental opposition groups like the 
Southern Environmental Law Center view the ACP as destructive 
and unnecessary, and they argue that the disruption that 
construction would cause is unwarranted.23 Landowners have 
challenged the use of eminent domain powers in the initial stages 
of the ACP’s construction as well, most significantly in the form of 
survey delegation powers.24 They argue that eminent domain 
powers are being misused by the ACP’s surveys, and some have 
stated their intent to withhold their permission for surveys of their 
land until compelled by the courts.25 
The construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline is but one 
example of the expansion of pipeline construction facing states like 
                                                                                                     
(“[T]he pipeline will help the region lower emissions, improve air quality, grow 
local economies and create thousands of new jobs in manufacturing and other 
industries.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 21. See id. (“[M]ore than 300 additional route adjustments were made to 
avoid environmentally sensitive areas and address individual landowner 
concerns . . . .”). 
 22. See Martz, supra note 9 (providing examples of environmentalists and 
landowners opposed to the construction of the pipeline). 
 23. See Risky and Unnecessary Natural Gas Pipelines Threaten Our Region, 
SOUTHERN ENVTL. L. CTR, https://www.southernenvironment.org/cases-and-
projects/proposed-natural-gas-pipeline-threatens-scenic-western-virginia (last 
visited Feb. 3, 2019) (“This unnecessary pipeline will not only harm the 
mountains, forests and waterways in it’s [sic] path—it will also disrupt the lives 
of the people living and working along its 600 mile long route and lock a new 
generation into decades more of fossil fuel consumption.”) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 24. See Michael Martz, Va. Supreme Court Upholds Gas Survey Law on 
Entering Private Property, but Requires Specific Notice to Landowners, DAILY 
PROGRESS (Jul. 13, 2017), http://www.dailyprogress.com/realestate/articles/va-
supreme-court-upholds-gas-survey-law-on-entering-private/article_5ed00238-
67f5-11e7-8f71-d77187416f70.html (describing the results of a recent Virginia 
Supreme Court case upholding surveying laws) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 25. See id. (“‘Eminent domain is supposed to be reserved for those cases in 
which the public good outweighs the public harm,’ said [the] president of Friends 
of Nelson, one of six groups that presented the governor's office . . . with petitions 
with more than 5,000 signatures of people opposed to the pipeline.”). 
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Virginia. A second construction project is underway in Virginia, as 
the Mountain Valley Pipeline (MVP) will wind through the state 
as well.26 This project has engendered a particularly passionate 
opposition from local landowners, as a federal judge has had to 
order an eminent domain seizure of private land over the 
objections of almost 300 property owners.27 In a scene illustrative 
of the human impact of eminent domain seizures, a landowner was 
described as having stood “as close as she could to the pipeline’s 
right of way, marked by blue-and-white flagged stakes, and dared 
the men with chainsaws to keep coming.”28 This opposition has, as 
in the case of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, succeeded in delaying 
and potentially even ending construction through the use of 
environmental challenges and vocal activism.29 
                                                                                                     
 26.  See Overview, MOUNTAIN VALLEY PIPELINE, 
https://www.mountainvalleypipeline.info/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2018) (listing the 
Virginian counties along the proposed MVP route) (on file with the Washington 
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 27. See Laurence Hammack, Judge Allows Mountain Valley Pipeline Work 
To Proceed on Private Property, ROANOKE TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/judge-allows-mountain-valley-pipeline-
work-to-proceed-on-private/article_c352fd47-2e15-59c9-9459-ebee94260015.html 
(“A federal judge on Friday granted Mountain Valley Pipeline immediate 
possession of the parcels, which it gained through the laws of eminent domain 
after nearly 300 landowners refused the company’s offers to purchase easements 
through which the pipeline will pass.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 28. Heather Rousseau, As Tree-Cutting Continues for the Mountain Valley 
Pipeline, So Do the Protests, ROANOKE TIMES (Apr. 15, 2018), 
http://www.roanoke.com/news/local/giles_county/as-tree-cutting-continues-for-
the-mountain-valley-pipeline-so/article_8b07005a-3ff3-11e8-a908-
a3db8fb38cec.html (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 29. See Tommy Lopez, Mountain Valley Pipeline Says Projects May Never Be 
Finished, WSLS 10 (Dec. 18, 2018), 
https://www.wsls.com/news/virginia/mountain-valley-pipeline-says-projects-
may-never-be-finished (‘‘Recent decisions by regulatory and judicial authorities 
in pending proceedings could impact our or the MVP Joint Venture’s ability to 
obtain all approvals and authorizations necessary to complete certain projects on 
the projected time frame or at all or our ability to achieve the expected investment 
return . . . .”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also Laurence Hammack, Mountain Valley Pipeline Files Response 
To State's Lawsuit, ROANOKE TIMES (Jan. 11, 2019), https:// 
www.roanoke.com/business/news/mountain-valley-pipeline-files-response-to-
state-s-lawsuit/article_96db0fec-5350-5822-b027-83b535423217.html (“The legal 
action is based on dozens of inspections conducted by DEQ officials and employees 
of MBP, a private company hired by the state to assist in monitoring construction 
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While every state in the Union has a statute delegating in 
some form surveying authority to private entities, the practice has 
been especially visible and controversial due to pipeline 
construction in the Commonwealth of Virginia.30 A major point of 
contention in pipeline development has centered upon the ability 
of private companies to use delegated eminent domain powers to 
survey land for possible future development.31 While recent 
decisions by both a federal Virginia District Court and the state’s 
Supreme Court have upheld the state’s surveying delegation law 
from landowner challenges, the issue is far from resolved.32 
Virginia therefore provides an ideal base for an examination of 
survey delegation laws in the modern context of utilities 
development. 
B. Questions Presented 
Delegation of eminent domain authority to private entities in 
the context of surveying for utilities development has become a 
topic of controversy in an era of ever-increasing economic 
development;33 and as such, a detailed look at the practice’s origins 
                                                                                                     
of the largest natural gas pipeline ever proposed for Southwest Virginia.”) (on file 
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 30. See Duncan Adams, Virginia Supreme Court Ruling Upholds Surveying 
Law; Challenges Still Possible, ROANOKE TIMES (July 13, 2017), 
https://www.roanoke.com/townnews/law/virginia-supreme-court-ruling-upholds-
pipeline-surveying-law-challenges-still/article_305a7461-38aa-5234-b168-
c240232b774d.html (“The Virginia Supreme Court issued a unanimous ruling 
Thursday that upheld a controversial state law allowing gas companies to survey 
private property for a possible pipeline route without an owner’s consent.”) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 31. See Martz, supra note 24 (“The two decisions, both written by Justice 
William C. Mims, represents the high court’s first judgments on a 2004 law that 
has become a flash point in the bitter battles between property owners and the 
developers of two natural gas pipelines proposed across hundreds of miles of 
Virginia.”).  
 32. See John Murawski, Atlantic Coast Pipeline to Take Landowners to Court 
to Clear Way for 600-Mile Project, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 16, 2017, 3:45 PM), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/article185036078.html 
(reporting on the legal conflicts surrounding the Atlantic Coast Pipeline’s 
expansion into North Carolina) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 33. See Martz, supra note 24 (describing the outcomes of two cases before the 
Supreme Court of Virginia involving “bitter battles between property owners and 
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and its current situation in the United States is warranted in order 
to formulate potential solutions. It is an issue that involves 
significant questions that define what amounts to a government 
taking and explores the extent to which a landowner has authority 
over his or her property. As a result, the issue potentially affects a 
massive portion of our society.34 In examining the practice of 
survey delegation, this note will attempt to answer four related 
questions: Do modern survey delegation laws find support in 
historical uses of eminent domain?35 Does surveying amount to a 
taking, especially in the wake of post-Kelo36 legal developments?37 
If it does amount to a taking, should compensation be made?38 
What method of compensation is to be used?39 Through analyses of 
these questions this note will argue that the current surveying 
delegation laws should be viewed as giving rise to a taking, and 
they should be compensable by either a nominal sum or one 
reached as part of a wider takings calculus.40 
II. Survey Delegation and Virginia 
A. § 56-49.0141 
The planning of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline has engendered a 
particularly noteworthy legal response in Virginia, as the recent 
decisions of the federal District Court in Klemic42 and the Supreme 
                                                                                                     
[natural gas pipeline] developers”).  
 34. See Murawski, supra note 32 (explaining that the  Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline from West Virginia to North Carolina will cross through the property of 
approximately 2,900 landowners’, twenty percent of whom have not signed 
voluntary agreements to allow for the use of their land). 
 35. See infra discussion Part III. 
 36. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005) (ruling that the 
city’s proposed condemnations of private properties served a public purpose and 
satisfied the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment). 
 37. See infra discussion Part IV. 
 38. See infra discussion Part V. 
 39. See infra discussion Part VI. 
 40. See infra discussion Part VII. 
 41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49.01 (2018) (granting natural gas companies the 
right to inspect and enter any property without permission of the owner in certain 
circumstances). 
 42. See Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 690 
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Court of Virginia in Palmer43 illustrated the modern controversy 
over survey delegation laws. While surveys may at first appear to 
be a relatively minor facet of wider eminent domain issues, these 
cases reveal the foundational rights at issue in landowner 
challenges at both levels of the American legal system.44  
At the heart of both cases is a challenge to Virginia’s survey 
delegation statute, § 56-49.01 (Natural gas companies; right of 
entry upon property).45 The first element of the statute is directly 
relevant to the analysis of this note, as it grants private entities 
surveying powers.46 The language of this element warrants 
inclusion in its entirety: 
Any firm, corporation, company, or partnership, organized for 
the bona fide purpose of operating as a natural gas company as 
defined in 15 U.S.C. § 717a, as amended, may make such 
examinations, tests, hand auger borings, appraisals, and 
surveys for its proposed line or location of its works as are 
necessary (i) to satisfy any regulatory requirements and (ii) for 
the selection of the most advantageous location or route, the 
improvement or straightening of its line or works, changes of 
location or construction, or providing additional facilities, and 
for such purposes, by its duly authorized officers, agents, or 
employees, may enter upon any property without the written 
permission of its owner if (a) the natural gas company has 
requested the owner's permission to inspect the property as 
provided in subsection B, (b) the owner's written permission is 
                                                                                                     
(W.D. Va. 2015) (“[I]t is clear that the common law recognizes, and state and 
federal courts have consistently upheld, the privilege to enter private property for 
survey purposes before exercising eminent domain authority and that Virginia 
law is fully in accord with the common law.”). 
 43. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Va. 2017) 
(“In sum, Palmer’s right to exclude others is not absolute. The common law has 
long recognized the privilege of an entity exercising eminent domain power to 
enter private property to conduct surveys.”). 
 44. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 45. See Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 679 (“In an attempt to stop ACP or any 
other company from entering their properties for this purpose, plaintiffs filed this 
action, alleging that the statute, on its face and as applied, violates the United 
States and Virginia Constitutions, and is thus void and unenforceable.”); see also 
Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 416 (describing appellant’s arguments that the statute 
authorizing entry-for-survey powers only applies to domestic public service 
companies, and more pertinently, that the statute is unconstitutional “because it 
impermissibly burdens a fundamental right”). 
 46. See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49.01(A) (noting the requirements for proper 
entry by a natural gas company to survey2018). 
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not received prior to the date entry is proposed, and (c) the 
natural gas company has given the owner notice of intent to 
enter as provided in subsection C. A natural gas company may 
use motor vehicles, self-propelled machinery, and power 
equipment on property only after receiving the permission of 
the landowner or his agent.47 
This statute has been utilized in the initial planning and 
surveying stages of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, and as a result, the 
normally unremarkable Virginian law has taken center stage in a 
heated legal conflict.48 
B. Palmer 
In Palmer, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered a 
declaratory judgement requested by the Atlantic Coast Pipeline.49 
Atlantic, an out-of-state utilities corporation, sought to enter the 
appellant’s property for surveying purposes under Virginia’s 
survey delegation statute, and was denied entry.50 The appellee 
then filed for a declaratory judgement requesting a declaration of 
its surveying rights.51 The circuit court found for the Pipeline, and 
the property owner appealed.52 The Supreme Court of Virginia 
considered whether an out-of-state corporation could make use of 
Virginia’s survey delegation law, and whether the law itself 
infringed on post-Kelo provisions of the Constitution of Virginia.53 
The Court found that the Pipeline could make use of the statute.54 
                                                                                                     
 47. Id. § 56-49.01(A). 
 48. See Martz, supra note 24 (articulating the use of the statute regarding 
the preparations for the pipeline and the different responses to the Virginia 
Supreme Court’s holding) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice); see also id. (“The Virginia Supreme Court has upheld, 
for the third time, a hotly debated state law allowing natural gas companies to 
enter private property without landowner permission to survey possible routes 
for new pipelines.”). 
 49. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 416 (detailing the procedural posture of the 
case).  
 50. Id. at 415–16.  
 51. Id. at 416. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 415. 
 54. Id. at 417. 
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The Court, however, found that it was limited to only addressing 
one prong of the Appellant’s demurrer:  
Palmer's demurrer argued that Code § 56–49.01 violated Article 
I, § 11 by (1) authorizing “a taking or damaging of private 
property for private use,” (2) authorizing ‘a taking or damaging 
of private property without just compensation,” and 
(3) “impermissibly burden[ing] a fundamental right.” However, 
her second assignment of error is restricted to the third claim of 
her demurrer. In fact, she expressly stated in her reply brief 
that she is not making a “takings” argument on appeal.55 
The exclusion of the first and second arguments of Palmer on 
appeal have left open the possibility that Virginia’s survey 
delegation statute may be analyzed as a taking by the state’s 
highest court in the future.56 The Supreme Court of Virginia went 
on to find that the survey law did not impermissibly burden a 
fundamental right under the Virginia Constitution.57 While the 
Palmer Court found for the defendant utilities company, it did so 
without involving a takings-based paradigm. 
C. Klemic 
In Klemic, a United States District Court in Virginia 
considered an action brought by landowners in Virginia against 
natural gas companies, arguing that Virginia’s survey delegation 
law was unconstitutional.58 The plaintiffs principally argued that 
the statute was facially unconstitutional because: (a) the statute 
violated the Fifth Amendment; (b) the statute violated the Fourth 
Amendment; (c) the statute violated the Virginia Constitution; and 
                                                                                                     
 55. Id. at 418. 
 56. See id. (waiving the “takings” arguments in Palmer due to pleading 
issues).  
 57. See id. at 420 (“The unambiguous language of Code § 56-49.01 
establishes the General Assembly's intent that the entry-for-survey privilege be 
available to foreign natural gas companies that do business within the 
Commonwealth . . . . Palmer's fundamental property rights do not include the 
right to exclude ACP . . . . [W]e affirm the circuit court's judgment.”). 
 58. See Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 678 
(W.D. Va. 2015) (outlining Plaintiff’s position “alleging that the statute [Virginia 
Code § 56-49.01], on its face and as applied, violates the United States and 
Virginia Constitutions, and is thus void and unenforceable.”). 
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(d) the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.59 In a 
memorandum opinion, the Court rejected each of these 
arguments.60 Most importantly for the purpose of this note, the 
Court specifically rejected an argument that the survey delegation 
law at issue could give rise to a compensable taking, finding that: 
In sum, the court concludes that a landowner does not have a 
constitutionally protected property right to exclude an 
authorized utility from entering his property for survey 
purposes and that, even if he did, § 56–49.01, on its face, does 
not effect a compensable taking of that right. The court thus 
holds that plaintiffs fail to allege a facial challenge to the 
statute under the Takings Clause.61  
The Klemic decision additionally rejected the Plaintiff’s claims 
that the Virginia delegation statute violated the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.62 An appeal of the decision followed.63 
This case is illustrative of the principal arguments against 
consideration of survey delegation as a compensable taking, and it 
includes a wide-ranging consideration of the issue from its 
historical basis to the present controversy.64  
The Klemic decision highlighted the importance of a takings 
paradigm when considering survey delegation statutes,65 while 
Palmer left open the possibility of a future revaluation of Virginia’s 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. at 687–97. 
 60. See id. at 678 (“[T]he court concludes that plaintiffs' facial challenges to 
the statute fail because the statute does not deprive a landowner of a 
constitutionally protected property right, and that plaintiffs’ as-applied 
challenges fail because they are not ripe. The court will therefore grant 
defendants' motion and dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.”). 
 61. Id. at 694. 
 62. See id. at 688, 698 (“For the foregoing reasons, the court concludes that 
plaintiffs' facial challenges to Virginia Code § 56–49.01 fail because the statute 
does not deprive a landowner of a constitutionally protected property right . . . .”). 
 63. See James Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., JUSTIA, 
https://dockets.justia.com/docket/circuit-courts/ca4/15-2338 (last visited 
February 8, 2019) (providing docket information about the appeal filed in the 
Fourth Circuit on October 30, 2015) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal 
of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 64. See id. (addressing how the First and Fourteenth Amendments relate to 
Taking Clause claims). 
 65. See id. at 691 (“Even assuming the existence of a right to exclude here, 
the court would still conclude that § 56–49.01 is facially constitutional under the 
Takings Clause because it does not effect a compensable taking of that right.”). 
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statute by its highest court.66 While Virginia has recently become 
an epicenter for survey delegation-related litigation as a result of 
ACP preparations, the questions examined in these cases are of 
importance to all American jurisdictions. This is especially true in 
light of the seminal Kelo v. New London decision by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, and the developments in the field of 
eminent domain that have followed it. 
D. Kelo and Eminent Domain Reform 
Although well-recognized and defined, property protections in 
American jurisprudence are not absolute, and they often come into 
conflict with the ability of the state to take property though the use 
of eminent domain.67 The right to property is both protected and 
controlled by the state, and governmental authority to impose on 
property rights has been a key issue dating to the formation of our 
nation.68 The state’s ability to impose upon the right to exclude 
through eminent domain authority has given rise to protracted 
legal debates, especially in the aftermath of the seminal Kelo v. 
City of New London decision.69   
In Kelo, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a 
Connecticut city’s use of eminent domain power as not being for a 
sufficiently public use.70 The case had been granted certiorari after 
                                                                                                     
 66. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 419 (Va. 2017) 
(failing to rule on the Taking Clause issue at hand). 
 67. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (“As its text 
makes plain, the Takings Clause ‘does not prohibit the taking of private property, 
but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power.’” (quoting First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 314 (1987))). 
 68. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process or law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
 69. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 490 (2005) (ruling that the 
City of New London’s “proposed condemnations” were for “public use” within the 
meaning of the Takings Clause).  
 70. See id. at 472 (“In assembling the land needed for this project, the city’s 
development agent has purchased property from willing sellers and proposes to 
use the power of eminent domain to acquire the remainder of the property from 
unwilling owners in exchange for just compensation.”). 
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the state supreme court had upheld the eminent domain use.71 The 
stated reason for the taking was economic development, and the 
property at issue was a home that had been in the family of one 
appellant for her entire life.72 “The question presented is whether 
the city’s proposed disposition of this property qualifies as a ‘public 
use’ within the meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution.”73 The Court did not find the 
taking to violate the Takings Clause and upheld the use of eminent 
domain authority.74 In the majority opinion, however, Justice 
Stevens did explicitly leave open the possibility of states passing 
additional restrictions on their own eminent domain powers.75 
The Kelo decision greatly strengthened the base of eminent 
domain powers while also leaving ample room for states to pass 
laws controlling their own takings powers.76 Many states have 
taken Justice Stevens’ advice to pass additional restrictions on the 
use of eminent domain authority, including the Commonwealth of 
Virginia.77 The Kelo decision—and the reactions to it—have 
returned taking issues to the forefront of modern public and legal 
debates, ushering in a new era of taking jurisprudence in the midst 
of the passage of numerous statutes and constitutional 
amendments.  
                                                                                                     
 71. Id. at 476. 
 72. Id. at 474–75. 
 73. Id. at 472. 
 74. Id. at 490. 
 75. Id. at 489 (“[N]othing in our opinion precludes any State from placing 
further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power. Indeed, many States 
already impose ‘public use’ requirements that are stricter than the federal 
baseline . . . established as a matter of state constitutional law . . . [or] in state 
eminent domain statutes . . . . ”). 
 76. See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response 
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2171 (2009) (describing the legal and public 
reactions to the Kelo decision and detailing the need for future research on the 
various state reactions to the decision). 
 77. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 420 (Va. 2017) 
(“The 2012 amendment to Article I, § 11 accepted this invitation to place further 
restrictions on the takings power.”). 
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III. Eminent Domain 
A. History of Eminent Domain 
For the purposes of this note, it will be useful to briefly outline 
the development of eminent domain and takings jurisprudence. 
Eminent domain authority originates in the basis of the sovereign 
as possessing, at a fundamental level, real property within its 
jurisdiction:  
Simply stated, eminent domain is an exercise of the inherent 
power of the sovereign. The power of eminent domain refers to 
the right of the sovereign, or of those to whom the power has 
been delegated, to condemn private property for public use, and 
to appropriate the ownership and possession thereof for such 
use upon paying the owner a due compensation.78  
Eminent domain laws, although based on legislative powers under 
English common law, are largely an American innovation:  
To be sure, the English and American colonial practices are the 
main ancestors of modern American eminent domain, but the 
writings of several Continental civil law jurisprudential writers 
also influenced the American law in its formative stage . . . . [i]n 
American law the subject has been raised to jurisprudential and 
theoretical levels that do not exist in English law.79 
The first eminent domain laws passed in the future United 
States were the “mill acts” of the Thirteen Colonies, allowing for 
the flooding of private land in order to construct mills.80 The 
colonial Massachusetts legislature enacted the first mill law in 
1713, and from that origin, state takings powers progressed to 
encompass successively “railroads (mid-to-late 19th century), 
mining in the Rocky Mountain West (late 19th century), urban 
renewal (mid-20th century), [to] Kelo-style economic development 
                                                                                                     
 78. Rhode Island Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Parking Co., L.P., 892 A.2d 87, 96 (R.I. 
2006). 
 79. William B. Stoebuck & John W. Weaver, Eminent Domain: Overview, 17 
WASH. PRAC., REAL EST. § 9.1 (2d ed.) (2018). 
 80. See Robert K. Fleck & F. Andrew Hanssen, Repeated Adjustment of 
Delegated Powers and the History of Eminent Domain, 30 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 
99, 104 (2010) (detailing the first iterations of colonial eminent domain takings in 
mill acts involving the flooding of land). 
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(late 20th century to present).”81 This evolution in takings 
jurisprudence gradually moved away from origins based in 
necessary community benefit to use for economic purposes, a shift 
that is nowhere better illustrated than in the modern context of 
natural gas pipeline development. 
The original ownership of the sovereign in real property allows 
the state to override the property rights that a landowner has in 
his or her ownership, but from the earliest days of American legal 
development limitations have been imposed on the scope of 
eminent domain powers at all levels of government.82 The text of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires 
that “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”83 The nebulous nature of 
this early constitutional prohibition on the uncompensated taking 
of private property has subsequently given rise to a massive body 
of takings law.84 Private land has often been taken through 
eminent domain powers for the purpose of developing resources 
beneficial to the public, such as in the case of a road or power line.85  
American takings law has gradually evolved to include private 
companies engaged in public infrastructure development as 
“public carriers,” allowing for the inherently public eminent 
domain powers to be exercised by private entities.86 As a part of 
the development of infrastructure through eminent domain 
surveys frequently must be commissioned, in order to plan the 
route of the road or utility. As the entities involved in utilities 
development tend to be private in the context of pipeline 
constructions, the surveys are generally taken by the same private 
                                                                                                     
 81. Id. at 103–104. 
 82. See id. at 103–06 (detailing the ways in which eminent domain power 
was restricted). 
 83. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 84. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80 (arguing that takings of almost any 
kind are permissible if a broad definition of constitutional limitations on eminent 
domain is taken). 
 85. See id. at 100 n.5 (providing examples of the “myriad” ways eminent 
domain powers have been applied).  
 86. See VA. CONST. ART. I, § 11 (“A public service company, public service 
corporation, or railroad exercises the power of eminent domain for public use 
when such exercise is for the authorized provision of utility, common carrier, or 
railroad services.”). 
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companies that will be developing the land.87 This intersection 
between the temporary nature of surveying and the nuances of 
takings jurisprudence has given rise to a body of law surrounding 
the delegation of eminent domain authority to private surveying 
groups. 
B. Common Law and Statutory Basis of Survey Delegation 
Private delegation of surveying authority is both historically 
well-grounded and currently widespread. The practice has grown 
from origins in the earliest American laws to the present, where 
all fifty states possess a version of a survey delegation statute.88 
Jurists have explored early versions of delegation statutes from the 
earliest days of American jurisprudence, with one early Virginian 
law allowing a turnpike company to have “full power and authority 
to enter upon all lands and tenements through which they may 
                                                                                                     
 87. See Martz, supra note 9 (discussing Dominion Power’s role in the survey 
controversy caused by the ACP). 
 88. See ALA. CODE § 18–1A–50; (1985); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 09.55.280; 
(1962); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12–1115; (1955); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18–15–1302; 
(1947); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.010; (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18–4–
515 and (2004); 37–3–113; (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48–13; (1967); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 704; (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.370; (2007); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 22–3–85(c) and (d); HAW. REV. STAT. § 101–8; (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7–705; 
(1881); 70 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/22.3; (2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 32–24–1–3; 
(2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 314.9; (1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26–512; (1964); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 175B.050; (2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48:217; (2003); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 18231; (2013); MD. CODE ANN. REAL PROP. § 12–111; (2006); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 164 § 72A; (1968); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.54; 
(1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 117.041; (2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11–27–39; (1972); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.420; (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70–30–110; (2013); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15–229; (LexisNexis 1967); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37.050; 
(LexisNexis 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 371:2–a; (1951); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:3–
16; (West 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A–1–8; (1981); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW 
§ 404; (LexisNexis 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 40A–11; (West 1981); N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 32–15–06; (West 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.03; (LexisNexis 
1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 22–114; (West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 35.220; (West 2003); 26 PA. CONS. STAT. Ann. § 309; (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
§ 24–12–9; (West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28–2–70; (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 49–33–6; (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29–16–121; (1932); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE 
ANN. § 111.019; (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B–6–506; (LexisNexis 2008); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 3518; (1947); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25.1–203, (2005); 56–49, 
(2004), and 56–49.01; (2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.01–170; (West 1984); 
W.Va. Code Ann. § 54–1–3; (LexisNexis 1923); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 182.38; (2000); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1–26–506. (2007). 
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judge it necessary to make said road; and to lay out the same 
according to their pleasure.”89 Successive laws passed in the 
Commonwealth of Virginia strengthened and expanded survey 
delegation authority: In 1782 Virginia empowered private 
surveyors for public roads to enter private land, in 1860 Virginia 
granted the authority to companies engaging in “internal 
improvement,” and in 1904 the power was extended to any 
company empowered with eminent domain delegation.90  
Virginia is somewhat atypical of state jurisdictions in its 
modern versions of these historic statutes, mostly due to its 
modern inclusion of notice requirements and its prohibition on the 
use of motor vehicles without owner permission.91 Other versions 
of surveying delegation statutes often place limitations on the 
extent of the authority given to private companies and may 
explicitly hold them liable for any damages, and beyond liability 
some jurisdictions also require the private entity to notify the 
landowner prior to surveying.92 As Virginia possesses both one of 
the more restrictive statutes of this type93 and is one of the 
foremost states involved in current pipeline disputes with the 
construction of the Atlantic Coast Pipeline, it provides an ideal 
example of the development of survey delegation jurisprudence. 
Delegation of surveying authority is indeed the main iteration 
of private delegation of eminent domain powers, with the 
Restatement (2d) of Torts stating that:  
The privilege of entry for the purpose of performance or exercise 
of such duty or authority may be specifically given, as where an 
employee of a public utility is in terms authorized to enter upon 
privately owned land for the purpose of making surveys 
preliminary to instituting a proceeding for taking by eminent 
domain.94  
                                                                                                     
 89. 2 VA. REV. CODE ch. 234, § 7 (1819). 
 90. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 419 (outlining the history of survey delegation 
statutes in the Commonwealth); see also VA. CODE ANN. tit. 17, ch. 56 § 4 (1860); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 1105f(3) (1904). 
 91. See statutes cited supra note 88 (codifying survey delegation statutes for 
each of the fifty states). 
 92. See generally id.  
 93. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 56-49.01 (codifying Virginia property law 
for right of entry upon land for Natural Gas companies).  
 94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 211 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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This granting of a privilege of entry is at the heart of Virginia’s 
delegation statute, and delegation in this way has broadly been 
upheld by courts. “Indeed, it appears that no court has declared a 
statute expressly giving a utility the right to enter private property 
for survey purposes before exercising eminent domain authority 
facially unconstitutional.”95 Delegation laws are both widespread 
and well established in American jurisprudence.96 
IV. Survey Delegation Laws as a Taking 
A. Survey Delegation and Pipeline Construction 
While the basis of statutory delegation in the legal history of 
Virginia and the wider United States is difficult to dispute, modern 
delegation laws are often used for divergent purposes when 
compared with their historic counterparts.97 Early delegation and 
eminent domain laws tended to focus on takings that benefitted 
the community in some way, such as the Massachusetts 1713 mill 
law or Virginia’s 1782 public road construction surveying statute.98 
It is telling that early manifestations of surveying delegation laws 
almost uniformly deal with surveys taken for the construction of 
mills, roads, canals, or other utilities of benefit to the immediate 
community: Every early court cited to explore the purpose for 
surveying by the Klemic Court is explicitly directed to the 
construction of a road or railway.99  
                                                                                                     
 95. Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 690. 
 96. See statutes cited supra note 88 (listing examples of state-level survey 
delegation laws). 
 97. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80, at 100 (describing the evolution of 
eminent domain law from its inception to the present.).  
 98. See id. (stating that “[t]he justification for these constitutional provisions 
was that grist mills were “public necessities” (unground grain had little value) 
and were required by law to serve all comers at regulated prices”); see also Palmer, 
801 S.E.2d 414 at 419 (“Virginia statutory law has done so for 235 years. In 1782, 
a law permitted authorized surveyors to enter private land to survey the location 
of public roads and made it unlawful for anyone to ‘stop, oppose, or hinder’ 
them.”).  
 99. See Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 688–89 (discussing the common law 
privilege to enter land for surveyor purposes, specifically for the construction of a 
road or railway). 
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While takings law has evolved to encompass modern utilities 
with no analogue in early law,100 this is nonetheless a critical 
distinction, as the animating impulse behind these early laws is 
often at odds with the uses to which their modern counterparts are 
put to.101 A road, canal, or railway provides an immediate benefit 
by providing access to the community it is constructed in.102 The 
almost sole concern of early eminent domain laws with mills, 
roads, and railways is illustrative of this need, as nearly every 
community required these necessities—often only able to be 
constructed through public use of private property—to survive. A 
pipeline, however, is generally only of benefit when viewed from a 
wider state or national paradigm and will provide little to no 
benefit to many of the communities that it passes through on its 
course.  
Pipelines like the Atlantic Coast Pipeline may pass through 
entire states in their path from the point of origin to coastal ports. 
Even in areas in which the pipeline does create jobs and stimulate 
economic growth, such benefits are born of a very different nature 
than the necessity-based early examples in takings 
jurisprudence.103 As a result, the policy behind the early laws and 
cases cited in Klemic and Palmer—to survey for public 
improvements of immediate benefit to landowners in the 
community—is absent in the modern controversies surrounding 
pipeline construction. Reliance on common law and historic 
statutory support for delegation laws in the context of pipeline 
surveying is therefore problematic, and there is a need for a 
reevaluation of the current definition of a private survey as not 
representing a taking.  
                                                                                                     
 100. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80, at 104 (discussing colonial eminent 
domain takings).   
 101. See id. at 100 (“We focus on five episodes of eminent domain use, 
involving mill dams (early-to-mid 19th century), railroads (mid-to-late 19th 
century), mining in the Rocky Mountain West (late 19th century), urban renewal 
(mid-20th century), and Kelo-style economic development (late 20th century to 
present).”).  
 102. See id. at 105 (“All six of the Rocky Mountain states that entered the 
Union in the latter part of the 19th century enacted constitutional provisions 
allowing miners and mining companies to employ eminent domain directly to 
build access roads, dump tailings, dig tunnels, and so forth.”). 
 103. See id. (juxtaposing the rationale behind early takings necessary for 
community development with later economic rationales). 
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B. § 56-49.01 after Kelo 
Surveying delegation laws have been especially susceptible to 
the wider controversies over takings powers centered upon the 
divisive Kelo decision. Virginia is one of many states to have passed 
statutory and constitutional property safeguards in the aftermath 
of Kelo that have raised new taking issues.104 Challenges centered 
upon these protections have been brought against Virginia’s 
delegation statute, and represent a new strategy for landowners to 
resist eminent domain use.105 The amended Article 11 of the 
Virginia Constitution reads in pertinent part: 
That the General Assembly shall pass no law whereby private 
property, the right to which is fundamental, shall be damaged 
or taken except for public use. No private property shall be 
damaged or taken for public use without just compensation to 
the owner thereof. No more private property may be taken than 
necessary to achieve the stated public use. Just compensation 
shall be no less than the value of the property taken, lost profits 
and lost access, and damages to the residue caused by the 
taking. The terms “lost profits” and “lost access” are to be 
defined by the General Assembly. A public service company, 
public service corporation, or railroad exercises the power of 
eminent domain for public use when such exercise is for the 
authorized provision of utility, common carrier, or railroad 
services.106 
Virginia’s post-Kelo amendment illustrates the tensions at the 
heart of surveying delegation.107 The amendment strengthens 
property rights while still explicitly allowing for the delegation of 
eminent domain powers to private companies.108 While modern 
                                                                                                     
 104. See Palmer v. Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC, 801 S.E.2d 414, 420 (Va. 2017) 
(defining the 2012 amendment to Article I, § 11 of the Virginia Constitution as an 
acceptance of the Supreme Court’s offer to state governments in Kelo). 
 105. See id. at 418 (considering Plaintiff’s arguments that Virginia’s post-Kelo 
constitutional amendment is unconstitutionally infringed upon by Virginia’s 
delegation statute).  
 106. VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.8686 
 107. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 420 (“[The amendment] . . . limited the 
parameters within which eminent domain may be exercised to affect these rights 
and expanded the compensation to be paid.”). 
 108. See id. (explaining that, while Article 11 of the Virginia Constitution does 
allow private companies to assert eminent domain power, it also strengthens the 
rights of individuals by limiting the definition of “public use” and expanding the 
definition of “just compensation”). 
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classification of utilities as a public service are ubiquitous, 
constitutional protections of private property, especially in the 
form of required compensation for a taking, are equally 
prevalent.109 Article 11 not only limits takings authority to the 
least restrictive public use, but it additionally requires just 
compensation to be made for any taking, including losses in profits 
and access.110  
This definition reflects a robust view of private property 
rights, not only protecting against actual confiscations but also 
against any other harms—even if largely symbolic, such as 
access—that may be caused by the state’s use of eminent domain. 
The Klemic decision avoids this issue by defining survey delegation 
laws as a limitation on the right to exclude and not as a taking:  
Although the Takings Clause protects property rights, 
including the right to exclude, it does not itself create them; 
“such property interests ‘are created and their dimensions are 
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law.’” To determine whether 
a landowner has a constitutionally protected property right to 
exclude an authorized utility from entering his property for 
survey purposes, then, the court must look outside the Takings 
Clause.111 
The dismissal of the Takings Clause in this instance does not 
properly account for the evolution of takings law in response to 
Kelo, as evidenced by Virginia’s post-Kelo constitutional 
amendment.112 This consideration is significant in the definition of 
surveying delegation laws: If delegation authority is found to be 
based upon the state’s power of eminent domain, and if the 
Constitution of Virginia requires just compensation to be made for 
any losses suffered as a result of eminent domain use,113 then there 
                                                                                                     
 109. See id. (explaining that Article II of the Virginia Constitution does not 
abrogate extensive common law privileges catalogued by the First Restatement 
of Torts and recognized in Virginia statutory law).  
 110. See id. (establishing a limited definition of “public use” expanded 
definition of “just compensation”). 
 111. Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 687 (W.D. 
Va. 2015) (internal citations omitted).   
 112. See Palmer, 801 S.E.2d at 420 (“The 2012 amendment to Article I, 
§ 11 accepted this invitation to place further restrictions on the takings power.”). 
 113. See id. (“The amendment also expands the definition of ‘just 
compensation’ to be ‘no less than the value of the property taken, lost profits and 
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is a strong argument to be made that surveys like the type 
discussed in this note amount to a taking.  
While the Palmer decision reached by the Supreme Court of 
Virginia rejected the argument that post-Kelo amendments to 
Article 11 were violated by the existence of Virginia’s surveying 
delegation law, this takings argument was not considered.114 
Redefining surveying delegation to constitute a taking would add 
protections to affected landowners while allowing for the continued 
use of delegated eminent domain power, and such a definition 
would not upset the arguments made by the Supreme Court of 
Virginia that “[t]he common law has long recognized the privilege 
of an entity exercising eminent domain power to enter private 
property to conduct surveys [and that] [t]his same privilege has a 
well-established historical pedigree in our statutory law.”115 
Consideration of private use of surveying powers as a public taking 
comports with both the legal legitimacy of surveying delegation 
laws and the protections to private property rights passed in the 
wake of Kelo.  
V. Compensation for Survey-based Takings 
A. Compensability 
If private use of public eminent domain powers to survey is to 
be considered a taking, a question remains as to whether it is 
compensable. As noted by the Klemic Court, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has not ruled definitively on the question: “While 
‘permanence and absolute exclusivity of a physical occupation’ 
always give rise to a compensable taking, ‘temporary limitations 
on the right to exclude’ do not.”116 Article 1 requires the 
government to compensate for takings, but the temporary nature 
                                                                                                     
lost access, and damages to the residue caused by the taking.’”). 
 114. See id. 418–20 (stating that “[w]hile the amendment also explicitly states 
that the right to “private property” is “fundamental,” nowhere does the amended 
language purport to modify existing property rights[,]” and that “Palmer 
expressly stated in her reply brief that she is not making a “takings” argument 
on appeal”). 
 115. Id. at 419. 
 116. Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d 691 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982)). 
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of the taking clouds this issue.117 While the Palmer decision did not 
examine a takings argument on procedural grounds, the Klemic 
court expressly rejected an argument that Virginia’s surveying law 
creates a compensable taking.118 Despite recognizing that the 
Supreme Court has left open the question of non-permanent 
compensable takings, the Klemic court stated that “a temporary, 
nonexclusive physical invasion that does not unreasonably impair 
a property's value or use is not a compensable taking.”119 This 
conclusion, far from a legal certainty, elides over an important 
distinction in the use of real property for residential purposes, 
which is the most visible type of property at issue in modern 
pipeline litigation. 
The reasoning of the Klemic court was based in part on a 
rejection of the plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish the issue at hand 
from PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,120 which “offers an 
example of a limitation on the right to exclude that does not rise to 
a compensable taking.”121 In rejecting the distinction between 
                                                                                                     
 117. See VA. CONST. ART. I, § 11 (“No private property shall be damaged or 
taken for public use without just compensation to the owner thereof . . . . Just 
compensation shall be no less than the value of the property taken, lost profits 
and lost access, and damages to the residue caused by the taking.”). 
 118. See Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 691 (“Even assuming the existence of a 
right to exclude here, the court would still conclude that § 56-49.01 is facially 
constitutional under the Takings Clause because it does not effect a compensable 
taking of that right.”). 
 119. Id. at 692. 
 120. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In PruneYard, 
the Supreme Court of the United States heard a case involving whether the 
California constitution protected speech on the grounds of a privately-owned 
shopping center. Id. at 74. Appellees were soliciting signatures on the grounds of 
the shopping center when a private security officer asked them to leave, and they 
later filed suit to enjoin the center from prohibiting them from their activities. Id. 
The trial court and the California Court of Appeal held that the appellees had no 
constitutionally protected right to speech on the premises, and the Supreme Court 
of California reversed, finding that the right existed on the private grounds, and 
that the property rights of the owners were not infringed. Id. The Supreme Court 
found that although a violation of the right to exclude could amount to a taking, 
a test must first be applied that considered the character of the taking, its 
economic impact, and any interference with the reasonable investment-backed 
expectations. Id. at 83. The Court found that the commercial nature of the 
shopping center ensured that the taking did not unreasonably impair its value or 
use, especially considering that the public was invited onto the grounds of the 
private shopping center. Id. at 83–84. 
 121. Klemic, 138 F. Supp. 3d at 691. 
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PruneYard and a challenge to Virginia’s surveying delegation 
laws, however, the Klemic court failed to properly recognize the 
key distinction between residential and commercial real 
property.122  
In PruneYard, “a California law required a shopping mall to 
allow members of the public to leaflet on its property.”123 “The 
shopping mall claimed that the law effected a taking of its right to 
exclude without just compensation, in violation of the Takings 
Clause.”124 The Supreme Court of the United States found against 
the mall, ruling that “[h]ere the requirement that appellants 
permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free 
expression and petition on shopping center property clearly does 
not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appellants’ 
property rights under the Taking Clause.”125 The commercial 
property at issue in PruneYard, however, is of a very different 
nature than the residential landholdings at issue in Palmer and 
Klemic. 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in PruneYard—that a state 
law infringing on a mall’s right to exclude without impairing the 
value of the property is not a compensable taking—is not 
applicable to the situation of a residential landowner, for whom the 
possession of the right to exclude may be one of the principal 
benefits derived from his or her investment in the real property.126 
A mall like the one at the heart of PruneYard functions as a public 
commercial space, and therefore infringements that do not affect 
the property’s value are of a much less consequential nature than 
they are in the residential context.127 In a concurrence to the 
                                                                                                     
 122. See id. at 692 (rejecting plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish the case at hand 
from PruneYard). The majority stated: 
Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish PruneYard, arguing that, unlike a shopping mall, 
their properties are used as personal residences . . . . That is true enough, but it 
does not take away from the Supreme Court's holding that a temporary, 
nonexclusive physical invasion that does not unreasonably impair a property's 
value or use is not a compensable taking. Id. 
 123. Id. at 691 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 76–79). 
 124. Id. at 691 (citing PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 82). 
 125. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.  
 126. See id. at 83 (determining that “[t]here is nothing to suggest that 
preventing appellants from prohibiting this sort of activity will unreasonably 
impair the value or use of their property as a shopping center”). 
 127. See id. (noting that “the PruneYard is a large commercial complex that 
THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND? 571 
PruneYard decision, Justice Powell highlighted the importance of 
this distinction, writing that “[s]ignificantly different questions 
would be presented if a State authorized strangers to picket or 
distribute leaflets in privately owned, freestanding stores and 
commercial premises.”128 The purpose of a commercial center like 
the one at issue in PruneYard is to attract storefronts who will pay 
rent to the owner, an arrangement that only provides benefit to the 
merchants if the wider public is actively encouraged to the 
property.129 In this context, the right to exclude is still present, but 
is a minor element of the value of the property in a commercial 
use.130 For real property used for residential purposes, however, 
the reverse is true. The right to exclude is particularly important 
in a residential context, and a failure to distinguish between the 
nature of public commercial and private residential property will 
inevitably undermine the ownership rights of a vast number of 
Americans. 
B. Recommendation 
Our legal system is, and has been, willing to require 
compensation for purely symbolic harm in the form of the tort of 
trespass.131 In the tort of trespass, the law allows for damages for 
a violation of the right to exclude even where the actual trespass 
                                                                                                     
covers several city blocks, contains numerous separate business establishments, 
and is open to the public at large”). 
 128. Id. at 96. 
 129. See id. at 77 (“The PruneYard is open to the public for the purpose of 
encouraging the patronizing of its commercial establishments.”).    
 130. See id. at 84 (“A State is, of course, bound by the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment . . . but here appellants have failed to 
demonstrate that the “right to exclude others” is so essential to the use or 
economic value of their property that the state-authorized limitation of it 
amounted to a “taking.”). 
 131. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL 
INTRUSIONS ON LAND § 158 (Am. Law Inst. 1965) (recognizing when one is subject 
to liability for trespass). The Restatement (Second) of Torts states: 
(“One is subject to liability to another for trespass, irrespective of whether he 
thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other, if he 
intentionally: (a) enters land in the possession of the other, or causes a thing or a 
third person to do so, or (b) remains on the land, or (c) fails to remove from the 
land a thing which he is under a duty to removed.”). Id. 
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may have not affected the value of the property in any way.132 The 
law of trespass recognizes that violation of the right to exclude that 
a landowner holds in his or her real property is significant 
regardless of the presence of physical damage,133 and it is logical 
for takings law to likewise allow for compensation when the harm 
caused to the property owner is of a largely symbolic nature. This 
is especially true in the instance of residential real property, where 
homeowners may rightfully see survey crews as a harbinger of 
future loss of their homes and land. It is significant that the fourth 
section of Virginia’s survey delegation law specifically states that 
the surveys do not constitute a trespass.134 Implicit in the inclusion 
of such a statement is the assumption that without the explicitly 
protective language, such surveys might be considered to be 
trespassory. The principal distinction between an authorized 
survey and a trespass is the legitimization of the former under 
state takings powers, as opposed to the willingness of the 
landowner to have his or her property utilized in such a manner.  
This wider understanding of eminent-domain based takings in 
light of trespass jurisprudence reflects considerations of both law 
and policy. The strong reactions of many state legislatures to Kelo 
represent a major shift in takings law, evincing a broader 
conception of legal protections of property that is necessarily 
accompanied by a narrower range of permissible eminent domain 
use without the need for compensation.135 An understanding of 
compensable takings that accounts for symbolic takings fits well 
with the modern evolution of property rights at the state level, 
especially considering the rising prominence of survey 
delegation.136 Policy concerns additionally lend support to this 
argument, as labeling the practice of surveying delegation as 
                                                                                                     
 132. See id. (stating that one is subject to liability for trespass “irrespective of 
whether he thereby causes harm to any legally protected interest of the other”). 
 133. Id. 
 134. See Klemic v. Dominion Transmission, Inc., 138 F. Supp. 3d 673, 679 
(W.D. Va. 2015) (“Any entry authorized by this section shall not be deemed a 
trespass. The natural gas company shall make reimbursement for any actual 
damages resulting from such entry.”). 
 135. See generally Somin, supra note 76.  
 136. See Martz, supra note 24 (providing an example of how survey delegation 
laws have gained prominence in the context of Virginian pipeline development). 
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compensable necessarily strengthens the property rights of 
landowners.  
VI. Appropriate Compensation 
If use of survey delegation statutes is to create a compensable 
taking of the landowner’s property rights, a question remains as to 
the proper mode and level of compensation. Within the Fifth 
Amendment’s requirement of just compensation, a great deal of 
room exists in the calculation and consideration of the 
compensation to be made to the deprived landowner.137 There are 
therefore two major arguments for the proper level of 
compensation, either by a set nominal fee or through a calculation 
incorporated into the wider taking compensation. 
A. Nominal Fee as Compensation 
One potential solution to the issue of compensation for 
survey- based takings is to award a nominal fee for each survey 
conducted. Nominal fees are considered the appropriate remedy in 
similar trespass cases:  
A harmless trespass, while still an actionable trespass, only 
entitles the landowner to recover nominal damages. As one 
court explained, upon a trespass “[t]he law implies damage to 
the owner, and in the absence of proof as to the extent of the 
injury, he is entitled to recover nominal damages.”138 
Nominal fees are unlikely to have any substantial impact on 
the overall exercise of surveying delegation laws and would 
engender little negative economic effects on potential future 
pipeline projects. The purpose of such a fee, however, is less 
economic than it is symbolic. Defining delegated surveying 
authority as a compensable taking strengthens the position of the 
property owner regardless of the amount awarded for the taking. 
                                                                                                     
 137. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (referring to the importance of property rights 
in the founding of the United States).   
 138. Daniel Harris Brean, Ending Unreasonable Royalties: Why Nominal 
Damages Are Adequate to Compensate Patent Assertion Entities for Infringement, 
39 VT. L. REV. 867 (quoting Pfeiffer v. Grossman, 15 Ill. 53, 54 (Ill. 1853)) at 917). 
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Even nominal fees recognize that an invasion of a residential 
landowner’s right to exclude is worthy of compensation.139  
As the state legislatures are the entities exercising eminent 
domain power through survey delegation statutes, it is appropriate 
for them to also set a level of compensation for the taking. This 
nominal cost could be easily passed to the private company seeking 
to make use of the stature to conduct surveys. Allowing each state 
to set a nominal fee would reflect the state-based nature of the 
survey delegation laws,140 and requiring state legislatures to 
compensate landowners would accurately reflect the reality that 
surveying delegation laws stem from state takings powers.  
B. Compensation as Part of the Takings Analysis 
An alternative method for setting the just level of 
compensation for use of survey delegation laws incorporates the 
survey into the wider takings analysis of the property. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has stated from an early point 
that the market value of the taken property expressed in monetary 
value is the proper remuneration for use of eminent domain 
powers.141 This approach would utilize the surveys conducted on a 
parcel of real property in calculating the market value owed to a 
landowner after eminent domain powers have been used. The 
principal advantage to varying the amount compensated based on 
the facts of the specific taking is one of flexibility, as the manner, 
impact, and duration of the surveys could all be considered in the 
evaluation of compensation. The main difficulty of this approach, 
however, will be in the determination of the fair market value of 
what in many cases will be symbolic takings with no subsequent 
permanent use of land. 
                                                                                                     
 139. See id. (“Nominal damages are a reasonable result in cases of trespass 
where the owner is not substantially injured . . . [a] landowner does not receive a 
substantial ‘toll’ for right of passage due to a harmless and innocent 
trespass . . . .”). 
 140. See statutes cited supra note 88  (evincing the state-based nature of 
survey delegation laws).  
 141. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (“That equivalent is 
the market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously 
paid in money.”). 
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Allowing the courts to determine the proper level of 
compensation rather than the legislature would be logical in 
consideration of the similar role exercised by the judicial system in 
compensating permanent takings142 and violations of the right to 
exclude like those found in tort law.143 Judicial control would 
additionally recognize that just compensation for a violation of a 
landowner’s right to exclude might not be met in all cases by the 
low level of a nominal sum. As the legislature is the font of the 
takings power condensed in survey delegation statutes, judicial 
control of compensation would also prevent a legislature from 
setting the level of compensation at an entirely insignificant level.  
Compensation to landowners for the use of survey delegation 
laws properly recognizes the nature of the legal interaction taking 
place between the landowner, the state, and the surveying private 
company. Both possibilities of compensation as set at a nominal 
level by the legislature or considered as part of a wider analysis by 
the courts reflect the takings-based nature of the surveys 
conducted, and as such either would function as appropriate 
redress.  
VII. Conclusion 
As the construction of new energy infrastructure continues to 
give rise to heated conflicts in the courts, a need has developed for a 
legal evolution. Suits brought against the construction of pipelines in 
Virginia alone have succeeded in delaying and potentially derailing 
both the Atlantic Coast144 and Mountain Valley145 pipeline projects. 
These legal battles have united environmental interest groups with 
individual property owners and against utility developers, creating a 
shifting landscape of revoked permits and bitter suits.  
                                                                                                     
 142. See id. (discussing how to ascertain just compensation for which 
petitioners are entitled for permanent takings).  
 143. See generally Brean, supra note 138.  
 144. See Surran, supra note 17 (discussing the delay to the Atlantic Coast 
Pipeline caused by the Fourth Circuit’s stay).  
 145. See Lopez, supra note 29 (“Leaders behind the Mountain Valley 
Pipeline say the project may never get finished. A report the company filed with 
a federal agency said the difficulties with getting necessary approval could delay 
the project, make it too costly or cause it to not get built at all.”). 
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This expansion of modern pipeline construction146 has collided 
with resurgent state and federal-based property rights, and in this 
context survey delegation laws have gained a newfound prominence. 
The delegation of state eminent domain authority to private entities 
for surveying purposes is an established practice in American 
jurisprudence, although its modern use in pipeline construction 
diverges notably from its original purpose.147 This discrepancy is 
made especially glaring by the widespread passage of laws and 
amendments designed to strengthen individual property rights in the 
wake of the Kelo decision.148 There is therefore a need to reevaluate 
the legal categorization of survey delegation laws in the modern 
context. Delegation of eminent domain powers in the context of 
surveying should be considered a compensable taking, a position that 
both reflects the takings-based character of the delegation laws and 
comports with similar doctrines in tort law. Compensation by 
nominal fee would serve to bolster the rights of landowners while 
minimalizing judicial impact on economic development, while 
compensation as part of a larger takings analysis would allow for 
greater flexibility and recognition of the landowner’s rights to 
exclude. Either method sufficiently recognizes that a takings-based 
violation of the landowner’s right to exclude has occurred when 
survey delegation laws are exercised by private utility developers.  
While this solution may not alleviate the ultimate taking of 
property in the development of pipelines, it represents a logical 
narrowing of takings authority that will benefit landowners 
nationwide. As energy infrastructure continues to grow it will become 
increasingly important to adequately protect the rights of property 
owners at every stage of the takings process. The legal evolution 
proposed in this Note, albeit a minor one in the grander body of 
takings jurisprudence, will be a positive step in that direction. 
                                                                                                     
 146. See generally Pending Natural Gas Pipeline Projects, RBN ENERGY LLC, 
https://rbnenergy.com/midi/gas-projects (listing pending natural gas pipeline 
projects) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice) (last visited Feb. 8, 2019). 
 147. See Fleck & Hanssen, supra note 80 (discussing the origins of eminent 
domain law in mill and road construction as opposed to the economic development 
rationale articulated in Kelo).  
 148. See Somin, supra note 76 at 2102 (“Forty-three states have enacted post- 
Kelo reform legislation to curb eminent domain. The Kelo backlash probably 
resulted in more new state legislation than any other Supreme Court decision in 
history.”) (citations omitted).  
